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The court enjoined Pacific Surimi from beginning summertime
production until Pacific Surimi could obtain a NPDES permit allowing
discharges to the Columbia River.
Alexandra Farkouh

N. Penn Water Auth. v. BAE Sys., No. 04-4446, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14773 (E.D. Pa.July 19, 2005) (holding section 113(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
prevents an injunction under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act for treatment of a public well when the Environmental Protection
Agency considered and rejected installing treatment in their Record of
Decision).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed BAE Systems's motion to dismiss all claims brought
by North Penn Water Authority ("NPWA"). BAE Systems argued that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over NWPA's claims because section 113(h) of CERCLA eliminates the court's ability to review
federal government response actions until the cleanup is complete.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had ongoing activities
at the North Penn Superfund Site; therefore, section 113(h) would
prohibit any challenge to the EPA's activities at that site.
The court found no jurisdiction under section 113(h) of CERCLA
over NPWA's RCRA claim. NWPA sought a declaration of liability under RCRA that BAE Systems's contamination of groundwater created
an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health.
NWPA also sought an injunction requiring BAE Systems to abate the
violations and provide treatment of a public well to put it back into
service for public water. The court determined that subject matter
jurisdiction over the RCRA claim depended on whether the claim was a
challenge to the ongoing federal cleanup at the North Penn Superfund Site. The EPA's Record of Decision, issued before cleanup began
at the site, showed that the EPA considered and rejected installing a
treatment system on the public well. The EPA's ongoing cleanup activities included restoration of the groundwater quality in the public
well. The court noted that although treatment on the public well may
not obstruct the EPA's clean up activities, the section 113(h) prohibition ofjudicial review is not dependent on the facts of each case. Since
the EPA considered and rejected treatment of the well, an injunction
issued by the court for treatment of the public well would be a challenge to the current cleanup of the Superfund site. The court found it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the RCRA claim. The
court also dismissed NWPA's claims under Pennsylvania state hazardous waste laws seeking treatment of the public well. The court found
these claims were also challenges to the current cleanup of the Superfund site, and therefore the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Issue I

COURTREPORTS

However, the court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction
over the CERCLA claim because NPWA's claim was to recover response
costs under section 107, and section 113(h) (1) permits judicial review
of this type of action. BAE Systems also argued that NPWA failed to
state a claim under CERCLA section 107 because their response costs
were inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan. The court
found this was a question of fact for trial. The court also permitted
NPWA's claims under the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act
since that statute permitted a private party to bring a claim for recovery
of response costs.
BAE Systems challenged the timeliness of NPWA's state tort law
claims, claiming NPWA was aware of the contamination 25 years ago
and there is a two-year statute of limitations on tort claims. Pennsylvania law allows for tolling of the statute of limitations until a plaintiff
knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained an injury caused by another person. When there is a continuing violation,
Pennsylvania law also tolls the statute of limitations until the contamination ceases. Although the court questioned whether the statute of
limitations would bar the state law claims, the court would not dismiss
the claims without more of a record.
The court dismissed BAE Systems's claim for injunction under
RCRA, but permitted its recovery of response costs and state tort law
claims to continue.
HeatherHeinlein
United States v. Washington, Dep't of Ecology, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050
(W.D. Wash. 2005) (holding: (1) water rights are impliedly reserved to
fulfill the primary purpose or purposes of an Indian reservation; (2)
the practicable irrigable acreage method is an appropriate means of
quantifying impliedly reserved agricultural water rights, but impliedly
reserved domestic water rights are to be quantified independently of
the agricultural rights; (3) under these circumstances, the quantification of impliedly reserved water rights does not necessitate the quantification of those rights for the entire Reservation or the inclusion of
sources beyond the Reservation, except as they pertain to the practicable irrigable acreage calculation; (4) an Indian is able to transfer impliedly reserved water rights, even to a non-Indian successor, but the
non-Indian successor may lose the rights through non-use, and the
rights are then lost to the tribe).
In 1855, the Treaty of Point Elliot ("Treaty") created the Lummi
Reservation ("Reservation") which covers two peninsulas in Washington. Both the Treaty and deeds conveying parcels of land to nonIndian successors in interest made no mention of water rights. The
portion of the Lummi Reservation involved in this dispute ("Case
Area") comprises just over half of the reservation, and the parties

